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Journalists as Scientists 
Notes Toward an Occupational Classification 
 
ELIHU KATZ 
Hebrew University of Jerusalem 
 
I 
 
No one knows what journalism is, occupationally speaking. Journalists certainly do not. 
They do not spend much time pondering whether they are a profession, an applied science, an 
art, an entertainment, or an industrial bureaucracy. But every once in a while it becomes 
apparent that the question is important - even for journalists. When every fourth or fifth 
automobile in Israel sports a bumper sticker protesting that "the people are against hostile 
media," or when the president of the state strongly implies that television journalists are 
guilty of malpractice in their coverage of the Palestinian uprising, it is time to ask what they 
mean by journalism, and to point out what, if anything, is wrong with their definition. 
There have been repeated attempts to fit journalism to the model of the liberal 
professions. Indeed, journalism does answer to some of the major criteria. It is an occupation 
based on the primacy of public service, first of all, even if most journalists work for privately 
owned newspapers. Studies of reasons for entering the profession (Johnstone, Slawski, & 
Bowman, 1976) strongly support the view that the wish to contribute to society is a major 
motivation. Benefit to the client is the defining characteristic of the professions (Blau & Scott, 
1963). The authority of journalism, like that of the other professions, is anchored in 
rationality rather than tradition or charisma (Parsons, 1968).  
Moreover, journalism as a profession may be said to be "looking for trouble," as are the 
other professions. Hughes (1964) has defined professionals as specialists in making routine of 
other people's emergencies. In her studies of the newsroom, Tuchman (1973) has shown how 
journalists go about this task of routinization. The theme of looking for trouble implies 
diagnosis, of course, and journalism qualifies on this score, too. 
 Journalists also share the norm of privileged communication. People who speak to 
journalists confidentially may expect their confidentiality to be respected both by the 
journalist and by the courts. It is considered appropriate, too, that complaints against 
journalists are dealt with by an institution designated to do so by the journalists themselves. 
There is a professional code of ethics, implicit or explicit, to guide the work. There is a 
definite implication here that journalism is in some ways self-governing. 
 But there are problems in fitting the professional model. Doctors or lawyers, for one 
thing, have clients, whereas journalists may be said to have clients only by stretching the 
point to define society as the client. Clergy and teachers may also be said to have society as 
their client, but their authority is strongly tempered by tradition and charisma. Unlike the 
other professions, the clients of journalism only rarely present themselves to the journalist or 
the newspaper for personal help. It is true that there is a large body of needs that journalism 
satisfies, but this process does not begin with a presentation of symptoms, a request for 
diagnosis, and certainly not for treatment. The journalists may be said to offer treatment only 
in the sense that the confrontation with information - sometimes "hostile" information - may 
be considered therapeutic in itself. After all, psychoanalysts also believe in the therapeutic 
power of confronting information. 
 Also different from other professions is that journalism makes information public. 
Journalists, like other professionals, may receive privileged communications, but their true 
vocation is to publish. "Publish, and be damned," said Horace Greeley, regardless of the 
consequences. The idea that this will do good, perhaps, is rooted deep in the ideal of 
libertarian democracy. 
That journalism goes on in an organization also departs from the doctor-lawyer model of 
professionalism. And last but not least, professionalism is anchored in an accumulated body 
of specialized knowledge and an intensive period of study that hardly holds for present-day 
journalism. 
 For all these reasons, journalism is not such a good fit to the professional model. But 
while we were looking elsewhere, all sorts of things have been happening in the sociology of 
the professions. The definition of professional has been modified and liberalized, for one 
thing. The other is that the ideal of the professional has been demoted somewhat, such that if 
journalism now may qualify on the first count, it may wish to be included out, on the second. 
 Thus professionals are all of gradually moving into organizations. The ideal of the lone 
professional – with all of his or her rights to independent judgments within the rules of ethics 
and the precincts of knowledge – is now being bureaucratized in hospitals, law offices, and so 
on, not to speak of social work agencies, schools, and the like that have always been 
bureaucratized. 
 Professional learning is being downgraded, too, as analysts distinguish between 
knowledge and the mystifications that professionals use to protect themselves from clients 
and others who might think less of them otherwise. There are great battles now in progress 
against the small print and unpronounceable words in legal contracts, and the Latin of the 
doctors. These are seen as conspiracies against the client and the public, and there is only 
little sympathy left these days for the possibility that some of this argot may serve as effective 
shortcuts for professional communication. 
Related to mystification of language and autonomous authority is the current popularity 
of the malpractice suit. The public is refusing to accept either the authority of the professional 
or the disinterestedness of professional peers in deciding what is competent and ethical and 
what is not. Altogether, the altruism of the professionals is continually being challenged, and 
all that remains of the image of the self-sacrificing physician is nostalgia. If journalists 
qualify as professionals, they now find themselves in better-or should we say worse? – 
company. The professions are moving in the direction of journalism. The exclusivity of their 
learning is being challenged, their skills placed under outside surveillance, the primacy of 
their altruistic dedication called into question, their individual autonomy compromised by 
bureaucratic authority. It appears that "the people are also against hostile professions," but 
they are also well aware that there are no available alternatives to doctors and lawyers in sight. 
Journalists have a share in this process of degradation of the professions and may even take 
some comfort in it for themselves. 
But the fit is still far from satisfactory. The fact remains that journalism has no body of 
knowledge on which it draws, or if it has, it is not explicitly aware of it. By the same token, it 
has no licensing procedure, and, indeed, democratic norms make this undesirable. It has no 
identifiable client except perhaps society as a whole. Its aim is publicity, not secrecy. 
 
II 
 
 A variant on the professional model is the model of the scientist, and a variant on that is 
the model of applied science. Strange as it may sound, I want to suggest that journalism 
answers to the model of applied science rather better, perhaps, than to the model of 
profession. Prima facie this sounds strange, not only for the obvious lack of the coherent 
body of knowledge required by science, but also for the absence of an organized set of 
propositions-a theory-and of a way of verifying testable derivations from the theory. 
Nevertheless, let us give it a try. 
 Following Epstein (1975), let us think of journalism as mapmaking. The world is divided 
into beats, where things of consequence are thought to be happening and bear watching. 
Sometimes these beats are actual places, such as Washington, New York, or Jerusalem. 
Sometimes they are institutions the foreign ministry, the army, the police, the universities, 
and the hospitals. Each beat has a population of actors, who are wielders of power –legitimate 
or not – and most of whom appear to specialize in conflict. Thus the daily news consists of 
indications of changes taking place in these foci of power, usually depicted in terms of events, 
and including assessments of why such change took place, who or what initiated it, whom it 
will affect, and whether it falls inside or outside agreed-on social norms (Alexander, 1982). 
From time to time, journalists are forced to redo the map itself as new places and new 
conflicts demand attention. 
In other words, journalism is, first of all, an agenda-setter, telling us where, what, and 
who are worth observing. It is also a barometer for indicating changes, usually defined as 
interruptive events-sometimes positive (medical breakthrough) but mostly negative (riot, 
death, famine, tax). Less apparent, but nonetheless present, is the role of journalism in 
defining and labeling deviance. By calling public attention to departures from norms, political 
actors are forced to respond, either by punishing the deviation or changing the norm 
(Alexander, 1982). Journalism also gives voice to other sides to a conflict, sometimes giving 
"equal time" to establishment spokesmen and to dissident minorities. It is in relationship to 
conflict and deviation that journalism is sometimes implicated in social change. 
 If this is a fair definition of what journalists do, then journalism may be something like 
meteorology; it tells about departures from the normal and threats to societal well-being, what 
Lasswell (1948) called "surveillance." Meteorologists scout the physical climate; journalists 
scout the social, economic, and political climate for deviations from the normal and the 
expected. Society is the client, diagnosis is the key, and treatment is generally not involved. 
In this sense, perhaps, journalism may be usefully thought of as a science, or, better, as an 
applied science, like meteorology. 
 There is another sense in which journalism mirrors science, and that is in the delicate 
balance between cooperation and competition within the occupational community. There is 
much cooperation – too much, say some people (Noelle-Neumann, 1982) – among ostensibly 
competing journalists who share observations, debate interpretations, and compare notes in 
many different ways. There is also the scoop – the race to be the first on an important story – 
which causes journalists, and scientists, to rush into print as soon as they can, often too soon, 
say their colleagues and critics. 
 But what body of knowledge is applied, what observational methods are involved, how 
are observations verified? We are back to the gnawing problems of theory, methods, and 
experimental research. It would be absurd to insist that journalists have abstract and codified 
theories, reliable methods, and a procedure for testing the validity of propositions derived 
from the theory. Still, there is something to be said for journalism even in these domains. 
 I believe that journalists may be said to hold "theories" about people and society – indeed, 
all of us have theories about people and society – but they are latent, unformulated, and 
uncodified. Even if they may be shown to be pervasive – as I believe they are – it is still fair 
to ask: What kind of a science is this? Surprisingly, there is a saving answer from the state of 
theory in art, and even in the physical sciences. Theories of art and music follow musical 
practice by many years; they are the inferences made by theories from the work of the 
composers and artists in the field. Something of the same, I understand, can be said about the 
philosophy of science that recodifies what scientists think they have been doing. It is true, I 
suppose, that composers and physicists have much more articulate knowledge and theory 
than have journalists. Without exonerating journalism for its delinquency, let us not rule it out 
altogether. I would not even rule out the possibility that journalists make derivations from 
their theories and put these to empirical test. 
 Let me give some examples of theories that I believe to be implicit in current journalistic 
practice: 
1. Journalists may be said to hold a voluntaristic theory of action, for example. Unlike 
social scientists and historians who look to situational constraints and determinisms of 
various kinds, journalists give far more credit to self-propelled human action. The idea that 
great men, like Sadat, may retreat into the desert, emerge with a decision, and act upon it, is 
on view in the daily newspapers, usually on a minor scale, and is equally true of the bad guys 
as of the good guys. Here, however, we might make room for the distinction that is the focus 
of attribution theory in social psychology which suggests that everyday observers, like 
ourselves, attribute "dispositional" motives to the good actions of the good guys and 
"situational" motives to the bad actions of the good guys and vice versa for the bad guys. One 
wonders whether journalists make this amendment in their observations. It would be of 
interest to compare journalists' theories of motivation and action to those of lawyers, for 
example. 
 2. Journalists believe that social change consists not only in personalities but in discreet 
events, in what Turner (1977) calls social dramas, involving outbursts of conflict and their 
resolution. Events, as it happens, are anathema to most sciences; events are unpredictable 
disruptions and science seeks for regularity and predictability. There are critical events in 
fields such as psychoanalysis, for example, that have been routinized and regularized by 
theory. Other sciences – meteorology, perhaps – are rather less prepared for the unexpected. 
 3. But journalists, too, are more than casually prepared for the unexpected. They have 
theories about types of events and even about their periodicity; they can even predict the 
duration of certain kinds of events (Tuchman, 1973). They know which events will "bump" 
other events off the public agenda. There is a marked regularity in the organization of the 
front page of the morning newspaper or the lineup of the nightly TV news: the war, the riot, 
the natural disaster, the strike, the sports contest, the fashion show, and so on (Hilgartner & 
Bosk, 1988). This, too, is a theory of society, whoever is its prime mover. 
 4. Journalists also have theories of the dynamics of events, as I have said, and they 
predict what will happen next. For example, I believe that journalists "expected" civil unrest 
in the territories occupied by Israel and this may explain their "exaggerated" attention to 
burning tires on the West Bank long before the intifada began. 
 Even if it is granted that journalists draw upon such latent theories of social  motivation 
and action in the construction and diagnosis of their "reality," the quasi-scientific analogy 
requires that we ask two further questions, namely, (1) Does journalism also contribute, 
cumulatively, to knowledge in these areas? and (2) Are these theories subject to challenge 
and correction? 
 To the first of these questions, I wish to suggest that the process of ferreting out the latent 
theories of journalists may also show that such theory is a continuous grappling with the 
dynamics of social conflict. I would not rule out the possibility that there may be a certain 
unspoken accumulation of wisdom on the subject that deserves codification. 
 But, obviously, because both the theory and its possible development are all so 
unformulated, not much can be said about it or for it. University programs in journalism 
would do well to make these latent theories manifest and to hold them up to the challenge of 
current theories in social psychology and sociology. There is no reason why journalists 
should not be informed of the goings-on in attribution theory or of the debate, among 
sociologists, between functionalist and conflict theories. I dare suggest that it is also possible 
that professional social scientists have something to learn from the journalistic exploration of 
these elementary processes - certainly, from the point of view of data (about journalists as 
observers and the observations of journalists), but also, just possibly, from the changing 
trends in (latent) journalistic theory (about which I am only surmising). 
 
III 
 
 Do journalists have anything that might be called a method? Ostensibly, the answer, once 
more, must be negative. Journalists cannot be said to have systematic means for unearthing 
truth. They do not have the diagnostic tools of the doctor, the rhetorical tools of the lawyer, 
and certainly not the instrumentation and methodologies of the scientist, even the (empirical) 
social scientist. I will offend the qualitative human sciences such as anthropology or clinical 
psychology if I even hint that there is any similarity. 
But journalists do have methods that are thought to produce truth. The interview is, 
perhaps, the primary method; and lately - in the wake of Watergate-various more stringent 
requirements are demanded by the profession (and its legal advisers) before facts based on 
single interviews are accepted as evidence. Some journalists also know how to read economic 
and social indicators, and the more use is made of such methodologies, the more emphasis 
will shift from personalities and events to trends, as they have in economic or health 
reporting. 
Again, one would expect that academic students of journalism – especially those in the 
professional schools of communication - would introduce the journalist to what social 
scientists know about, say, the interview or the psychology of witnessing or the tracking of 
social trends. Much work has been done in these areas (e.g., Trope, 1982), and one wonders 
why there is so little confrontation between them and the traditional methods of gathering 
truth in journalism. 
 
IV 
 
 I hope that these notes on the fit between journalism and the professions and journalism 
and science - however unpolished - illustrate the usefulness of this kind of exercise. It is not, 
however, just an exercise for its own sake rather, it implies a curriculum of theory and 
method for university teaching and research in journalism and communication. 
 The worth of the approach, perhaps, can be illustrated by reference to Epstein's (1975) 
discouraging and disparaging summary of the essential incompatibility between journalism 
and truth. If our own summary is of any value, it offers a basis for refuting Epstein. 
 Thus Epstein asserts that journalism is unable to tell the truth. Take a flu epidemic, for 
example, says Epstein. Unlike the doctor, the journalist is unable to diagnose the disease 
firsthand; he must rely on someone else's testimony. This might not be so bad, continues 
Epstein, if the journalist had the ability to cross-examine his source; but no, he must take the 
source's word for it, because he is unable even to ask good questions for fear of alienating the 
source or because the deadline is pressing. Nor can he check his story against his colleagues' 
reports for fear of losing a scoop. 
 Implicit in Epstein's account, of course, is an idealization of the professions and of 
science. Doctors, too, are often incompetent to make diagnoses without the aid of informed 
colleagues; they are often as pressured by time and by scooping their colleagues as are 
journalists. Indeed, the sense of urgency is one of the characteristics of the professional 
culture, and the scoop is one of the defining characteristics of the culture of science. If 
Epstein overstates the doctor, he understates the journalist. It is true, of course, that 
journalists need an expert to tell them that there is a flu epidemic, but journalists may be quite 
adequate – if they are on the spot – to see for themselves that there is an intifada. There are 
many things that journalists can see for themselves – even though one must grant the typical 
inadequacy of their specialized knowledge. 
 Even if we assume that Epstein is correct in asserting that journalists only report what 
their establishment sources tell them - or, if they are investigative journalists, that they report 
what their subversive sources tell them – we should not be so quick to dismiss this part of the 
journalists' job. If a man in a three-piece suit gets up on a podium and says, "I declare war," 
the job of the journalist is to report this performative statement, perhaps to comment on the 
spokesman's right to say so, and to observe the consequences. Part of the journalist's job is, 
indeed, to report what elites are saying, and to comment upon it. The idea that truth may 
reside in professional attention to relevant statements - independent of the truth of the 
statements themselves – eludes Epstein. There are words and deeds that constitute data that 
journalists are charged with collecting and communicating. The journalist's ability to 
cross-examine sources is also understated by Epstein. It is true that journalists are often 
dependent on their sources, but the reciprocal is also true. In recent years, we have seen a 
great spurt in the public cross-examination of sources in live interviews on radio and 
television. It is ironic, perhaps, that such cross-examination may be more characteristic of 
electronic journalism than print, perhaps because of the irresistibility of appearing on TV. 
 Epstein says that the consensual validation and independent confirmation that 
characterizes the professions is not present in journalism. How then explain writers like 
Noelle-Neumann (1982) who complain about journalists that they are too closely tied 
together in a monolithic interpretive community that sees things in the same way? There is 
too much sharing, she claims, implicitly questioning Epstein's image of the lone journalist 
racing against time and the competition. 
 We should consider not only consensual validation, which is appropriate to individual 
scientists, but institutional validation, which is appropriate to the professions. In the end, it 
may be the hospital – with its division of labor and its checks and balances – and the 
adversary system, not just individual 
lawyers, that are able to get at the truth. It is the organization (as in a hospital or scientific 
laboratory) or the system (as in a court of law) that approaches truth, better than the private 
practitioner or individual scientist. The same thing might be said of journalism. It is the 
newspaper that is the instrument of truth-telling rather than the individual story or the 
individual journalist. Returning to the model of the professions, we might say that just as 
society is the collective "client," the newspaper or news program is the collective 
"practitioner." 
